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abstract: Williamson, Linsky, Paseau and others proposed a solution to Church-
Fitch’s knowability paradox that is based on typing knowledge; however, it received 
some criticism . Carrara and Fassio objected that the approach has no paradox-in-
dependent motivation, it is thus ad hoc. In the first part of the paper, I dismiss such 
criticism by carefully stating typing approach principles that are based on non-cir-
cular formation of propositions and intensional operators operating on them . In the 
second part of the paper, I demonstrate that the firm foundation of the approach 
prevents the variants of the paradox by Florio, Murzi and Jago that were developed 
as allegedly unresolvable by typing knowledge . The revenge form of Church-Fitch’s 
knowability paradox, which had been proposed by Williamson, Hart, Carrara and 
Fassio, fares badly as well, since it is likewise based on violation of reasonable typing 
rules .
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1 Introduction
The famous Church-Fitch’s knowability paradox (FP; see Sec . 1 .1 below) seems to 
prove that the epistemic optimism known as verificationism, which maintains 
that every truth is knowable, is wrong .1 As a remedy to FP, several writers 
– most notably (Williamson 2000) – offered a typing approach (TA). It con-
sists in typing knowledge (TK), i .e . dividing our intuitive notion of knowledge 
1 FP was discovered by Church who reviewed Fitch’s paper in 1945; the review is now 
published as (Church 2009) . FP was first published in (Fitch 1963, 138) . For an overview of 
the topic, including various approaches to FP, see (Brogaard and Salerno 2008) .
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into type variants; knowledge operators are then distinguished by their range 
of applicability . In appropriate contexts, I will use the narrower term “TK” 
instead of “TA” .
Two kinds of criticism target the TA to FP . (i) (Carrara and Fassio 2011) 
and others objected that the TK is not well-founded; the TA is thus an ad 
hoc approach . (ii) Another criticism attempted to show that the TA is unsat-
isfactory, for it is incapable of solving a . paradoxes similar to FP that were 
constructed by (Florio and Murzi 2009) and (Jago 2010), and b . the Revenge 
Form of FP for TA (as I will call it) that was proposed by (Williamson 2000), 
(Hart 2009), (Carrara and Fassio 2011) .
In response to the (i)-type criticism, I will distinguish two kinds of typ-
ing, the Tarskian and the Russellian TA. While the former is based on lan-
guage/metalanguage distinction (Tarski 1956), the latter is framed within the 
Russellian ramified theory of types (RTT), cf . (Russell 1908), (Whitehead and 
Russell 19 10–13) . Church’s reconstruction of Russell’s RTT, the theory of 
r-types (Church 1976), is the most prominent RTT; it was applied to FP by 
(Linsky 2009) and (Giaretta 2009) . Other theoreticians are not committed 
to RTT, which might be the reason of their reluctant or deprecatory attitudes 
to the TA . The details of the Russellian TA, which I will state in Sec . 2 .1, have 
not been mentioned in the discussion yet; arguably, they provide the best 
justification of the approach .
The firm foundation of the Russellian TA yields a straightforward re-
jection of both a .-type and b .-type paradoxes, thus dismissing the (ii)-type 
criticism, because they harbour errors, as I will demonstrate in Secs . 3 and 
4 . The Revenge Form of FP for TA in particular violates the principle of 
non-circular formation of propositions and intensional operators (such as 
knowledge operator) operating on them, which is embodied in the Vicious 
Circle Principle (VCP).
1.1 Fitch’s knowability paradox
FP is generated by a combination of apparently acceptable principles con-
cerning knowledge and possibility . These are often expressed using a familiar 
notation of multimodal logic, when
“Kp” represents ‘It is known (by someone) that p’
and
“Kp” represents ‘It is possible to know (by someone) that p’ .2
2 I use double quotation marks for quotations of expressions; single quotation marks are 
used to indicate propositions and other ‘extralinguistic’ entities, or for shift in meaning .
33J . RACLAVSKý:  The typing approach to Church-Fitch’s knowability…
The denotatum of “K” is a subset of all propositions that are currently true .
The thesis of verificationism is then formalised as
(Ver)  ∀p(p  Kp)  verificationism (knowability principle)
and the most important derivation rules capturing the semantic properties 
of “K” are3
(Fact)  Kp  p    factivity of knowledge (K-axiom)
(Dist)  K(p  q)  Kp  Kq  distributivity rule for K
FP also employs the following, quite unproblematic rules of modal logic:
(nec)  if  p, then  p   necessitation rule
(ER)   ¬p  ¬p   exchange rule for modal operators
The source of FP’s paradoxicality is the surprising fact that (Ver) is in-
compatible with the evident principle that we are not omniscient:
(nonOmn)  ∃p(p  ¬Kp)   non-omniscience
Applying classical logic and the above rules, the addition of (Ver) to (non-
Omn) leads to the contradictory of (nonOmn), which is
(Omn)  ∀p(p  Kp)   omniscience
Here is the full inference, i .e . FP:4
Fitch’s knowability paradox (FP)
1 . ∃p(p  ¬Kp)      (nonOmn)
2 . p  ¬Kp       an instance of 1 .
3 . ∀p(p  Kp)      (Ver)
4 . (p  ¬Kp)  K(p  ¬Kp)    substitution of 2 . for p in 3 .
5 . K(p  ¬Kp)      from 4 . and 2 . by MP
6 . K(p  ¬Kp)     assumption per absurdum
7 . Kp  K¬Kp     from 6 . by (Dist)
8 . Kp  ¬Kp     from 7 . by (Fact) on its right conjunct
9 . ¬K(p  ¬Kp)     reductio
3 I assume that  and  are ‘metalinguistic’ variants of the material conditional  and 
equivalence ≡ . Some rules with  may be considered as (formal) definitions .
4 My exposition largely follows (Brogaard and Salerno 2008) . Various deduction systems 
may amend the inference in different ways . For example, in step 4 . some would consider 
substitution of 2 . to p  Kp, which would be derived from 3 . by application of Universal 
Instantiation (i .e . ∀-elimination) .
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10 . ¬K(p  ¬Kp)  from 9 . by (nec)
11 . ¬K(p  ¬Kp)  from 10 . by (ER)
Thus, 11 . contradicts 5 ., which means that the addition of (Ver) to 
(nonOmn) leads to (Omn) .
1.2 Two kinds of typing knowledge and their criticism
Some approaches attempt to solve FP by restricting the formulation of veri-
ficationism, while others revise its underlying logic . The TK is adjacent to 
both approaches; it consists in stratification of the knowledge operator into 
an infinite hierarchy of the operators K1, K2, …, Kn, while each has a restricted 
range of applicability (the thesis of verificationism is thus restricted); deriva-
tion rules are amended accordingly . The crucial proposition 8 . is then shown 
to be non-contradictory, the reductio part of the inference is therefore pre-
vented .
The TA to FP was first considered by Church in his famous review 
of Fitch’s paper, since typing is involved in both the then standard devices 
for solving paradoxes, i .e . Russell’s RTT and Tarski’s hierarchy of metalan-
guages:5
Of course the foregoing refutation of Fitch’s definition of value is strongly sug-
gestive of the paradox of the liar and other epistemological paradoxes . It may be, 
therefore that Fitch can meet this particular objection by incorporating into the 
system of his paper one of the standard devices for avoiding the epistemological 
paradoxes . (Church 2009, 17)
The first use of the TA as a solution to FP was proposed in (Williamson 
2000, 280–28 1) . It is evidently the Tarskian TA, since Williamson explicitly 
evoked the stratification of T-predicate, whereas he did not mention Russell, 
or any Russellian topic .
The Tarskian TA has in fact been adopted by many writers: (Paseau 
2008), (Halbach 2008), (Paseau 2009),6 (Florio and Murzi 2009), (Jago 
2010), (Carrara and Fassio 2011) . As mentioned above, an application of the 
Russellian TA to FP was published by (Linsky 2009) and (Giaretta 2009); 
5 This is somehow inaccurate . Russell himself typed propositions and even truths (White-
head and Russell 1910–13, 44–45), but not intensional operators such as belief or knowledge 
because he did not model belief attitudes as attitudes towards propositions, as e .g . Church 
did . Church proposed a hierarchy of belief-predicates as a solution to the paradox of Bouleus 
in (Church 1973–74, 23–24) .
6 Halbach suggested a paradox similar to FP, yet Paseau noticed its closer similarity to the 
Knower paradox (Kaplan and Montague 1960); I will thus not discuss it in this paper . Further 
investigation was made in (Rosenblatt 2014) .
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they used a version of r-types by (Church 1976) . However, justification of 
RTT is rudimentary in Linsky’s paper; and Giaretta’s paper is rather focused 
on the relationship of FP to the Russellian logical framework .
Most of the previously-mentioned writers, notably (Carrara and Fassio 
2011), objected that the TA is an ad hoc approach, for it has no paradox-inde-
pendent motivation . However, if one clearly distinguishes the Tarskian and 
the Russellian TA, and embraces the latter, such objection seems unfounded, 
since it is largely inapplicable, which I am going to show in both this and the 
following section .
In (Tarski 1956), the hierarchy of T-predicates is forced by the existence of 
the Liar paradox . Each nth-level predicate “Tn” (where 1  n  ℕ+) is only 
applicable to (the names of ) sentences Sn–1 of the level n–1, thereby prevent-
ing the building up of paradox-producing sentences Sn such as “¬Tn⌜ Sn⌝” . One 
may naturally object with (Kripke 1975) as to why our sole intuitive T-pred-
icate is split into infinitely many partial ones, and why a sentence of a cer-
tain level n cannot contain a T-predicate belonging to the same or a higher 
level . Exactly the same questions can be raised about the Tarskian hierarchy 
of K-predicates . On the other hand, however, one should not disregard an 
important argument in favour of the Tarskian TA: the purpose of typing is 
to help deliver a formally correct explication of the intuitive notions . If the 
TA is successful in this respect, philosophical ‘worries’ should be sidelined .
In contrast to the Tarskian TA, the Russellian TA assumes a slightly dif-
ferent picture of our conceptual scheme . Being historically related to Russell’s 
paradox and the Russell-Myhill paradox, the proper cause of typing are indi-
viduation and the forming of propositions and intensional operators, which 
is governed by the VCP . These are exposed in details in Sec . 2; they provide 
the best justification of the TA .
Since the crucial features of the Russellian TK have not been addressed 
by the aforementioned criticism, one may provisionally adopt the conclusion 
that the Russellian TK is untouched by it – being therefore a viable approach 
to FP . This assessment is also supported by the solutions to paradoxes similar 
to FP and its revenge form . Moreover, (Linsky 2009) documented that the 
TA is even capable of solving many other epistemic paradoxes . As regards 
various possible philosophical objections targeting the material adequacy of 
the TK, see the discussion in (Paseau 2008) .
Finally, some philosophers’ worry that type theories are obsolete noble 
ruins belonging to the history of logic is a weighty underestimation of the 
current development . Though Russell’s type theory is being indeed studied by 
philosophers and historians of logic (cf . e .g . (Landini 1998), (Linsky 1999), 
or (Irvine 2016)) modification of the type theory by (Church 1940), which 
evolved from Russell’s, Chwistek’s and Ramsey’s type theories, has consti-
36 Prolegomena 17 (1) 2018
tuted the leading logical framework in computer science for several decades 
(cf . e .g . (Andrews 2014) and (Coquand 2015) for introduction) . Formalisa-
tion of language is dominated by Montagovians (cf . e .g . (Thomason 1974), 
or (Janssen 2017) for introduction), or their rivals (e .g . (Chatzikyriakidis and 
Luo 2017)) who also use modifications of Church’s type theory . new RTTs 
have been proposed and advocated e .g . in (Tichý 1988) and (Kamareddine, 
Laan and nederpelt 2010); ramification is also evoked in the Homotopy 
Type Theory (Univalent Foundations Program 2013), which has been much 
discussed recently .
2 The Russellian typing approach
2.1 Propositions, types, and the Vicious Circle Principle
It is important to realise that propositions are considered within the Russel-
lian TA as meanings of sentences, i .e . abstract entities distinct from sentences 
(which are sequences of letters) .
Propositions are intensional entities, they have intensional (i .e . not ex-
tensional) individuation: two such propositions can be equivalent (congru-
ent) without being identical . A proposition in this sense is an entity with 
fine-grained structure,7 not a possible-world proposition, which is a flat 
mapping from possible worlds to truth values . Intensional operators, such 
as the knowledge operator, operate on propositions, not on their values .8 As 
argued by Church, and e .g . by (Tichý 1988), the adoption of RTT is then 
inevitable:
If, following early Russell, we hold that the object of assertion or belief is a 
proposition and then impose on propositions the strong conditions of iden-
tity which it requires, while at the same time undertaking to formulate a 
logic that will suffice for classical mathematics, we therefore find no alterna-
tive except for the ramified type theory with axioms of reducibility . (Church 
1984, 521)
Remark. Within possible-world semantics, the notion of intension has 
been redefined: intension is a mapping from possible worlds . What is tra-
ditionally called “intension” is then often called hyperintension, cf . e .g . (Cress-
well 1975) .
7 For an overview of explications of the notion of structured proposition see e .g . (King 
2016) . The consequences of the fact that FP presupposes the notion of fine-grained proposi-
tion was investigated by (Giaretta 2009) .
8 Such analysis of belief sentences is one of the leading proposals, cf . e .g . (McKay and 
nelson 2014) .
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As is well known, (classical) type theories classify entities into (pairwise 
disjoint) sets of objects called types;9 in logic (as a set of derivation rules) based 
on type theory types provide variability-ranges for variables, while no variable 
takes more than one type as its variability-range . A certain individual, for 
example, is then said to be of type – i .e . belonging to the type – of individuals . 
I will call types that classify extensional entities types for extensions. Examples: 
the type of individuals, the type of characteristic functions of individuals . On 
the other hand, types for intensions classify intensional entities . Examples: the 
type of propositions, the type of monadic intensional operators .
Every RTT involves at least one type for intensions and this type is rami-
fied, i .e . split into its orders 1, 2, …, n . The types are 1st-order, 2nd-order, …, 
nth-order types for intensions. Examples: the type of 1st-order propositions, 
the type of 2nd-order propositions,  .  .  ., the type of nth-order propositions; 
the type of (say) 2nd-order propositions and the type of 2nd-order monadic 
intensional operators are examples of 2nd-order types . If it will be clear from 
the context that an object under consideration is a proposition, I will briefly 
say that it is of order k instead of “belongs to the type of kth-order proposi-
tions” .
not every RTT has to involve all the types mentioned above . Russell’s 
RTT, for example, contains only the type of individuals and many ramified 
types for intensions: for propositions, for propositional functions of one vari-
able, for propositional functions of two variables, … In the RTT by (Tichý 
1988), which is implicitly assumed in this paper, there is only one ramified 
type for intensions but many types for extensions .
In RTTs similar to Church’s, cumulativity is inbuilt to avoid a certain 
restrictiveness (Church 1976, 747) . Here I formulate it for the case of propo-
sitions:
The Principle of Cumulativity of Propositions
Every kth-order proposition (for 1  k  n) is also a k + 1st-order 
proposition .
The type of k + 1st-order propositions is thus a superset of the type of kth-or-
der propositions, i .e . the types are not pairwise disjoint . The order of propo-
sition, i .e . its belonging to a type of propositions of a certain order, can vary 
from context to context of consideration – being, of course, always restricted 
by the VCP . nevertheless, there is always a unique lowest possible order of a 
9 The following description of type matters aims to cover the ideas of almost all classi-
cal type theories . However, in modern type theories used in computer science things can be 
different . Especially, types are routinely considered within computer science as letters whose 
interpretations are certain sets; in this paper, I speak directly about such sets as types .
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proposition . With few clear exceptions, I will usually speak directly about the 
lowest possible order of a proposition .
Categorisation of entities into types is technically implemented in the 
typing rule, see Sec . 2 .2 below . Admittedly, it needs a justification, which is 
provided mainly by the VCPs that are exposed in the rest of this section .
(Churchian) simple theory of types, e .g . (Church 1940), can be under-
stood as implementing the principle I will call the VCP for Extensions:
The VCP for Extensions
no function (as mapping) can be its own argument or value, or a part 
of these .
If this principle is applied, characteristic functions (i .e . functional correlates 
of sets) are stratified into hierarchy . Consequently, the famous Russell’s para-
dox (Russell 1903) is prevented .10 
Russell even realised that the simple theory of types cannot prevent the 
Russell-Myhill paradox he subsequently discovered (Russell 1903, Klement 
2016) . The paradox presupposes a proposition that quantifies over the to-
tality of propositions of which it is a member – which is circular . Russell 
estimated that hierarchisation of propositions would be a suitable solution to 
the problem . His supreme logical theory, RTT, provides this (Russell 1908, 
Whitehead and Russell 1910–13), while it also hierarchises propositional 
functions .
Constructing his RTT, Russell deployed the VCP for Intensions, as I will 
call it . He formulated it in more variants; the formulation in (Russell 1908, 
237), resembles .
The VCP for Intensions
Whatever contains a variable (in the objectual sense) cannot be in the 
range of the variable, it is thus of (i .e . belongs to) a higher type .
To illustrate, a composed proposition containing p cannot be in the range 
of p . This has a consequence for quantification because a proposition which 
quantifies over propositions collected in the type of kth-order propositions 
has to be of a higher order, i .e . it must belong to a (higher-order) type over 
which it cannot quantify .
10 Since functions as mappings were not present in (Russell 1903), the above-evoked 
solution to Russell’s paradox with functions-as-mappings does not occur there (but e .g . in 
Church 1940) .
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Critics of RTT seems to overlook the message conveyed by the VCPs, 
though they are entailed by an even more fundamental and unimpeachable 
principle, namely that an entity cannot be fully specified (defined, …) by 
means of the entity itself (cf . e .g . (Whitehead and Russell 1910–13, 41)) .
2.2 The Russellian typing rule
In conformity with what has been said in the previous section, the order of a 
proposition commensurates with the number of its (successively) embedded 
intensional operators . Thus a ‘base’ proposition such as ‘Fido is a dog’ is of 
order 1, whereas an epistemic proposition (as we may call it) such as ‘Xenia 
knows that Fido is a dog’ is of order 2; the proposition ‘Yannis knows that 
Xenia knows that Fido is a dog’ is of order 3 .11
The existence of such intuition related to the notion of knowledge can 
be documented e .g . on the familiar Socrates’ paradox (as one may call it) . 
When uttering that he knows nothing, Socrates hardly stated a contradiction 
as its formalisation K∀p¬Kp suggests . According to the TK, Socrates rather 
expressed the 3rd-order proposition (the notation conforms to the rule ex-
posed below) .
K2∀p1¬K1p1
This captures our intuition that Socrates can be ignorant1 of all 1st-order 
propositions while knowing2 the 2nd-order proposition that he knows1 no 
1st-order proposition . Socrates has a kind of ‘meta-knowledge’ .
As indicated above, several typing rules implementing the idea have been 
formulated in literature (cf . esp . (Linsky 2009), (Giaretta 2009)) . My follow-
ing Rule for Typing Propositions attempts to cover various cumulative RTTs, 
while it abstracts from details peculiar to the particular theories .12
Firstly, some auxiliary terminology . Propositions built up from subordi-
nate propositions by means of extensional connectives, e .g . pk  qk–1, will be 
called extensionally compound propositions, while propositions built up using 
11 (Carrara and Fassio 2011, 189–90) doubted the very discrimination between ‘base’ 
and epistemic propositions that is involved in the TA . According to their intuition, the propo-
sition ‘Xenia lies in the bed’ can be seen as an epistemic proposition because it informs us that 
Xenia does not know what happens in the kitchen . However, this objection can be challenged 
by referring to the fact that the latter proposition is logically unrelated to the former, and that 
typing is based on the nature of the former proposition, not some other proposition entailed 
by it in the minds of some agents .
12 The RTT capable of convenient treatment of all details of the notions such as knowl-
edge, modality, belief attitudes, etc ., is (Tichý 1988) . In that framework, “Kk” expresses knowl-
edge operator and denotes possible-world intension whose values are relations-in-extension 
between individuals and propositions .
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intensional operators, e .g . Kmpk, will be called intensionally compound proposi-
tions. (Step ii . needs supplementation which occurs below .)
The Rule for Typing Propositions
 i . The lowest possible order of any proposition involving no inten-
sional operator is 1 . Let pk be any proposition of order k, for 1  k .
  ii . The lowest possible order of an intensionally compound proposition 
such as Kmpk, for 1  k  m, is m +1 .
iii . The lowest possible order of an extensionally compound proposition 
is identical with the order of its subproposition that has the greatest 
order in it .
Obviously, the language L of multimodal logic is modified in such a 
way that “p” (“q”, etc .) is excluded in favour of “pk” (“qk”, etc .) and “Kp” is 
excluded in favour of “Kmpk, for k  m; “k” is omitted if “p” is not a proposi-
tional letter . Though modal operators  and  can be treated as intensional 
operators operating on propositions, to simplify typing I will consider them 
as operating on possible-world propositions by means of which formulas 
such as “pk” are interpretable (on the denotational level); as mere extensions, 
possible-world propositions belong to one unramified type .
Examples .
a . The proposition
p1
is a 1st-order proposition .
b . As regards compound propositions, their (lowest possible) order is 
not written in the superscript, it is easily derivable using the Rule for 
Typing Proposition . For instance,
K1p1
is of order 2 (cf . Step ii .) . Thanks to the Cumulativity Principle, m in (the 
record of ) Kmpk need not equal k, it can be a greater number . In the 3rd-order 
proposition K2p1, for example, the operator K2 is applied to the 1st-order 
proposition p1 that serves here as a 2nd-order argument for K2 .
c . The extensionally compound proposition
p1  ¬K1p1
is of order 2 because its subproposition K1p1, which has the greatest order in 
it, is of order 2 (cf . Step iii .) . The epistemic proposition
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K2(p1  ¬K1p1)
is of order 3 (cf . Steps ii . and iii .) .
d . Expressions
“K1p2”, “K1K2p1”, “K2K2p1”, “K1(p2  q1)”
do not express any propositions – because of VCP, no such propositions 
are specifiable . In other words, the formulas such as “K1p2” are meaningless 
strings of letters that are not coherently interpretable (I will return to this is-
sue following the next paragraph) .
A comment on Step ii. Step ii . partly presupposes definition of the order 
of the operator Km (which is usually offered within RTTs) . Such definition 
says that if, in some context, the order Kmpk is m + 1 + l, for m  k and l  0, 
the order of Km is m + 1 + l as well . To explain: using λ-abstraction one can 
transform the proposition Kmpk into the operator
λpkKmpk
which is convertible, by η-rule of λ-calculus, to Km . In λpkKmpk, pk is a vari-
able whose range is the set S of propositions on which the operator Km is ap-
plicable . The VCP for Intensions tells us that the proposition Kmpk cannot be 
in S . S must consist of propositions of a lower order than the order of Kmpk . 
Consequently, if the order of pk is k, the order of Kmpk, and thus also of Km as 
such, must be strictly greater than k .
Some philosophers might perhaps object that the incapability of the 
formulas listed in the above point d . to represent anything only indicates 
the restrictiveness of the adopted formalism . However, the view would be a 
serious misunderstanding of what I have stated so far . It is undoubtedly true 
that the language L considered here is restrictive . This is because its purpose 
is to represent existing propositions . As is clear from Sec . 2 .1, no proposition 
seemingly represented by (say) “K1p2” exists . A possible way out is to assume 
a knowledge operator that does not operate on propositions, but e .g . on (the 
names of ) sentences . Since the VCP for Intensions has nothing to do with 
sentences, “K1 ⌜ p2 ⌝” may be treated as wff . But this construal of knowledge 
is incompatible with the greatest assumption of this paper, namely that sen-
tences express (structured, fine-grained) propositions .
3 The solution to FP by Russellian typing knowledge
Knowledge operators and propositions containing them are governed by the 
system of derivation rules that are the results of type-theoretic specification 
of their untyped predecessor .
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(Dist2(1,2))   K2(p1  q2)  K2p1  K2q2
(Fact2(2))   K2p2  p2
(MP2)   p2p2  q2  q2
The TA to FP reveals the consequences of such specification .
Keeping the order as low as possible, while appropriately also typing the 
theses of non-omniscience and verificationism, the key part of FP is amended 
as follows .
The typed version of the first part of FP
1’ . ∃p1(p1  ¬K1p1)    (nonOmn1(1))
2’ . p1 ¬K1p1   an instance of 1 .
3’ . ∀p2(p2  K2p2)   (Ver2,2(2)) 
4’ . (p1 ¬K1p1)  K2 (p1  ¬K1p1)  substituting 2’ . for p2 in 3’ .
5’ . K2(p1  ¬K1p1)  from 4’ . and 2’ . by(MP2)
6’ . K2(p1  ¬K1p1)   assumption per absurdum
7’ . K2p1  K2¬K1p1   from 6’ . by (Dist2(1,2))
8’ . K2p1  ¬K1p1   from 7’ . by (Fact2(2))
The proposition 8’ . is not a contradiction, and so the reductio is thus 
blocked .
As rightly noticed by (Williamson 2000, 281), the proposition 8’ . is 
only non-contradictory provided the following rule is not valid:
K2p1  K1p1
The reasons for its invalidity have been discussed by several authors, cf . (Wil-
liamson 2000), (Paseau 2008), (Linsky 2009), my reason is given in Sec . 3 .1 
below .
Before proceeding further, I will deflect an important argument raised 
against the TA by (Carrara and Fassio 2011, 191) . The argument attempts 
to show that the TA to FP is internally incoherent, since it misapplies its 
own typing principles . Its authors argued that the TA must admit (notation 
adapted)
K1p1  K2¬K1p1
instead of 7’ . because K2p1 is (allegedly) not type-theoretically possible . Using 
(Fact), one would then derive the contradiction K1p1  ¬K1p1 and the reduc-
tio would not be blocked . However, the TA employing a Churchian RTT is 
not affected by this argument because such RTT implements the Principle 
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of Cumulativity and so embraces propositions such as K2p1 . One is thus not 
forced to adopt K1p1  K2¬K1p1 instead of 7’ . In other words, the argument 
is only directed against a TA framed within a non-cumulative type-theoretic 
framework .13
3.1 The invalidity of the rule K2p1  K1p1 and two inconclusive 
arguments against typing knowledge
In this section, I am going to reject three arguments against the TA . Two of 
them (c . and b .) were constructed by Florio with Murzi and Jago, but the 
first one (a .) was proposed, as well as dismissed, by the authors who offered 
the TA to FP .
a . As mentioned in the preceding section, the typing solution to FP 
requires that the rule K2p1  K1p1 is considered invalid . However, mere prin-
ciples of type-theoretic correctness provide no reason for its adoption or re-
jection . (Williamson 2000), (Linsky 2009) and mainly (Paseau 2008; 2009) 
attempted to explain the invalidity of the rule by appealling to epistemic access 
to p1 .
(Linsky 2009) also cautiously wrote that propositions are typed due to 
their content, while logical relations between them reflect procedures for de-
termination of epistemological states . This idea can be generalised . I suggest 
that it is sufficient to maintain that p1 is known if it is justified by a certain 
reason. The reason surely constitutes the attitude towards p1 being knowl-
edge, rather than mere belief or contemplation .
Justifiedmpk  ∃qm ReasonForm(qm,pk)    for k  m
The reasons qm serving for justification of pk can be, say, inevitable steps in 
a derivation of pk . Some qm can be epistemic propositions or propositions 
about an epistemic route to pk – these can be e .g . mth-order propositions 
certifying that pk was acquired from a reliable source . But one can leave the 
exact nature of qm undecided and so not relying exclusively on the ‘epistemic 
explanation’ of the invalidity of the rule in question .
It follows from these considerations that for knowing2 p1 one needs a 
certain q2 which helps to justify2 p1 . The respective reason2 thus makes K2p1 
irreducible to K1p1 . The rule K2p1  K1p1 is therefore invalid .
b . This conclusion even leads to rejection of the argument raised against 
the TA by (Jago 2010) . Jago based it on the principle (notation adapted)
13 The consequences of acceptance of the Cumulativity Principle for the solution of para-
doxes were studied by (Peressini 1997); the present case is not mentioned there .
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(KT2(2))     K1p1 ≡ K2T1p1
where T1 operates on typed propositions . Here I show only four most impor-
tant steps of Jago’s modification of FP:
1j . K2(T1p1  ¬K1p1)  assumption
2j . K2T1p1  K2¬K1p1  from 1j . by (Dist2(2,2))
3j . K1p1  K2¬K1p1   from 2j . by (KT2(2))
4j . K1p1  ¬K1p1   from 3j . by (Fact2(2))
However, one should notice that T1p1 is equivalent to p1 by the well-
known T-axiom . Jago’s (KT2(2)) is thus equivalent to
K1p1 ≡ K2p1
which can hardly be maintained by a proponent of the TK, cf . the considera-
tions stated in a . (and at the beginning of Sec . 2 .2) .
c . The Paradox of Idealization by (Florio and Murzi 2009), also allegedly 
unresolvable by the TA, differs from FP even more . The paradox utilises the 
modified (Ver)
∃p(p  ∀x(Kxp  Ix))
where “Kx” represents ‘it is known to x that’ and “I” represents ‘has epistemic 
abilities which finitely exceed ours’ . It is further assumed that the proposi-
tion (which is derived from other assumptions that need not to concerns us 
now)
Ka(q  ¬∃xIx)
where q is only knowable by idealised agents, and so a is an idealised agent:
Ia
By (Dist), (Fact) and Existential Generalization one easily derives the con-
tradiction
∃xIx  ¬∃xIx
Regardless of the character of q, however, the puzzle is evidently based 
on the assumption that an idealised agent ‘knows’ that no idealised agent 
exists . This is obviously self-refuting, so one need not to deploy the TK for 
rejection of the inference .
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4 The solution to the Revenge Form of FP by the Russellian 
typing knowledge
As mentioned in the introductory section, the first version of the Revenge 
Form of FP for the TA,14 which serves as an argument against the TA to FP, 
was suggested by Williamson:
We seem able to grasp the idea that p is totally unknown, in a sense which entails 
that p is unknowni for each level i, but which does not entail that p is untrue . If 
so, we can simply adapt Fitch’s argument by considering the proposition that p 
is totally unknown truth, since that proposition cannot be knowni for any level 
i . naturally, such quantification over levels must be handled with great care
(Williamson 2000, 281)
The inference considered by Williamson, and also mentioned in (Carrara 
and Fassio 2011, 188), was further elaborated in (Hart 2009, 322–323) . 
Hart explicitly stated its conclusion that every truth is necessarily known at 
some type level t .15
Here I offer symbolisation of the whole intended inference .16
The Revenge Form of FP for the TA
 1r . p  ∀t¬Ktp  assumption (of order t + 1) per absurdum
 2r . Kt+1(p  ∀t¬Ktp) from 1r . by (Ver)
 3r . (Kt+1p  Kt+1 ∀t¬Ktp) from 2r . by ‘(Dist)’
 4r . (Kt+1p  ∀t¬Ktp) from 3r . by ‘(Fact)’
 5r . (Kt+1p  ¬Kt+1p) from 4r . by Universal Instantiation
 6r . ¬(p  ∀t¬Ktp)  reductio (since 5r . is a contradiction)
 7r . ¬(p  ∀t¬Ktp) from 6r . by (nec)
 8r . (p  ¬∀t¬Ktp) from 7r . by classical propositional logic
 9r . (p  ∃tKtp)  from 8r . by De Morgan Law for Quantifiers
10r . ∀p(p  ∃tKtp) from 9r . by Universal Generalization
14 The notion of revenge paradox here employed conforms to (Beall 2008): the strength-
ened Liar based on “This sentence is not true .”, for instance, is the revenge form of the Liar 
for the trivalent approach that relies on the weak falsity predicate “is false” and cannot safely 
handle its strengthened form “is not true” .
15 The criticism resembles the criticism of Russell’s RTT by (Gödel 1944), (Fitch 1964) 
and (Priest 2006), which I cannot discuss here for reasons of brevity .
16 The key formula “∀t¬Ktp” was suggested by (Carrara and Fassio 2011) . The inference 
does not entirely parallel FP but it is largely similar .
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However, the inference is suspicious from the very beginning . Consider 
the formula “∀t¬Ktp” first: if the use of ∀ is not hollow, ∀ binds some vari-
able within “¬Ktp” . Evidently, that variable is t . Yet having such an assump-
tion, one departs from the official notation of type theories in which “Kk” 
is a primitive symbol, so the numeral “k” is its irreplaceable part – it is not a 
variable .
Because the inference presupposes that t is a variable bound by ∀, to 
challenge the (Russellian) TA one must admit that, since formulas (and prop-
ositions) of the TA have to be typed,
“Ktp” stands for “Kʹm(pk,t)”, for 1  k  m, where Kʹm is a novel binary 
operator .
There are several possibilities as to how to interpret “t” and, conse-
quently, how to understand “Kʹm” . On the most probable reading, t ranges 
over natural numbers ℕ+ that represent orders . Let us adopt this as a working 
hypothesis . For further simplification of our considerations assume m = k . 
(As we will see below, my findings will not hinge on the two particular as-
sumptions .)
now let us focus on the crucial steps of the correctly rendered version of 
the Revenge Form of FP . Its second proposition is
2r’ . Kʹk+1(pk  ∀t¬Kʹk(pk, t), t + 1)
Applying appropriate rules of distributivity and factivity that govern these 
two novel operators Kʹk and Kʹk+1 one infers
5r’ . (Kʹk+1(pk, t + 1)  ∀t¬Kʹk(pk, t))
Applying Universal Instantiation to the right conjunct of 5r’ . one gets
6r’ . (Kʹk+1(pk, t + 1)  ¬Kʹk(pk, t + 1))
However, 6r’ . is not a contradiction . Consequently, the rest of the untyped 
Revenge Form of FP cannot be derived .
The Revenge Form of FP for the TA is thus based on a hidden equiv-
ocation . If the (seemingly correctly typed) formulas of the inference are 
disambiguated and properly typed, and thus matched with some existing 
propositions, the inference does not go through .
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I discriminated between two kinds of the TA to FP, the Tars-
kian and the Russellian (Sec . 1 .2); they both provide a solution to FP . The 
distinction helps to offer a compelling justification of the TA because the 
Russellian TA is induced by non-circular formation of intensional entities, 
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namely propositions and operators operating on them, most notably the 
knowledge operator; this results in the VCP for Intensions and the Typing 
Rule for Propositions (Sec . 2 .1) . Thus, the Russellian TA cannot be refused 
as an ad hoc solution, which was an important point of criticism e .g . in (Car-
rara and Fassio 2011) . The TA solution to FP is in fact only a by-product of 
the approach .
The TA solution to FP provides a successful blocking of the respective 
paradoxical inference (Sec . 3), which has been known since (Williamson 
2000) . The blocking assumes invalidity of a certain rule widely discussed in 
literature, for which I offered another reason (Sec . 3 .1); this also helped to 
solve the modified FP by (Jago 2010) .
The Russellian TA reinforced in this paper enabled an easy rejection (Sec . 
4) of the Revenge Form of FP for the TA by (Williamson 2000), (Hart 2009), 
(Carrara and Fassio 2011) . The paradox covertly deploys an unusual binary 
operator of knowledge at type-level, while violating typing principles .17
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